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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The Attorney General's Office is represented by Robert 
N. Parrish, Suzanne M. Dallimore, Stanley H. 01senf and David J. 
Schwendiman. They were opposed in the May 30th hearing before 
Judge Boyd Bunnell by Utah Power and Light on behalf of 
subpoenaed employees who were represented by Mr. Stephen Nebeker. 
Several other Utah Power and Light employeesf Norm Maxfield, 
Orrin Colby, Jr. and Karl Stott, were represented by Mr. Donald 
B. Holbrook. Emery Mining Company, although not permitted to 
argue at the may 30th hearing, did present argument on September 
12th as a party to the proceeding and was represented by Messrs. 
Robert Reeder and Francis Wikstrom. 
Mr. Max D. Wheeler, representing Michael C. Thompson, 
Bruce A. Conklin, and Michael Ziemski, was also present at the 
September 12th hearing as was Sumner J. Hatch, representing L. 
Brent Fletcher. Messrs. Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher 
were not proper parties in the challenge to the Subpoena Powers 
Act, however, for there was nothing pending concerning these 
individuals at that time. Judge Bunnell denied the motions filed 
by them, holding that they would have to seek any remedy in 
another court. (Transcript of hearing, September 12, 1984, at 
pp. 107-113, said transcript is hereinafter referred to as uT-2,n 
since there are two hearing transcripts. The transcript of the 
May 30, 1984 hearing is cited as "T-l"). 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OP UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, 
7th District Court No. CS-1 
Case No. 20268 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the Utah Subpoena Powers Act unconstitutional 
because there is no automatic judicial review of each subpoena 
once the court has authorized the investigation? 
2. Is the Subpoena Powers Act unconstitutional because 
it does not require target and self-incrimination warnings? 
3. Is the Act unconstitutional because it is too 
vague? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be 3ecure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
United states Constitutionr Amendment y 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-22-1 through 77-22-3 
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It 
is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that it is necessary to grant 
subpoena powers in aid of criminal 
investigations and to provide a method of 
keeping information gained from 
investigations secret both to protect the 
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to 
prosecution and to clarify the power of the 
attorney general and county attorneys to 
grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses 
whose testimony is essential to the proper 
conduct of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution* 
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses 
and require production of evidence — 
Contents of subpoena Interrogation before 
closed court. (1) In any matter involving 
the investigation of a crime, the existence 
of a crime or malfeasance in office or any 
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney 
general or any county attorney shall have the 
right, upon application and approval of the 
district court, for good cause shown, to 
conduct an investigation in which the 
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel 
their attendance and testimony under oath 
before any certified court reporter, and 
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require the production of books, papers, 
documents, recordings and any other items 
which constitute evidence or may be relevant 
to the investigation in the judgment of the 
attorney general or county attorney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the 
names of possible defendants and need only 
contain notification that the testimony of 
the witness is sought in aid of criminal 
investigation and state the time and place of 
the examination, which may be conducted 
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the 
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform 
the party served that he is entitled to be 
represented by counsel. Witness fees and 
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county 
attorney may take written application to any 
district court and the court may order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be held in 
secret; that such proceeding be secret; and 
that the record of testimony be kept secret 
unless and until the court for good cause 
otherwise orders. The court may order 
excluded from any investigative hearing or 
proceeding any persons except the attorneys 
representing the state and members of their 
staffs, the court reporter and the attorney 
for the witness. 
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witness — 
Refusal of witness to testify or produce 
evidence — Powers granted prosecuting 
attorneys in addition to other powers. In 
any investigation or prosecution of a 
criminal casef the attorney general and any 
county attorney shall have the power to grant 
transactional immunity from prosecu on to 
any pc -on who is called or who is tended 
to be lied as a witness in behalf f the 
state *never the attorney general r county 
attor deems that the testimony of such 
perso: necessary to the investigation or 
prosecL i of such a case. No prosecution 
shall be - stituted against the person for 
any crime aisclosed by his testimony which is 
privileged under this action, provided that 
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should the person testify falsely, nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to 
prevent prosecution for perjury. 
If during the investigation or prose-
cution a person refuses to answer a question 
or produce evidence of any kind on the ground 
that he may be incriminated thereby, the 
attorney issuing the subpoena may file a 
request in writing with the district court in 
which the examination is being conducted for 
an order requiring that person to answer the 
question or produce the evidence requested. 
The court shall set a time for hearing and 
order the person to appear before the court 
to show cause, if any he has, why the 
question should not be answered or the 
evidence produced, and the court shall order 
the question answered or the evidence 
practiced unless it finds that to do so would 
be clearly contrary to the public interest, 
or could subject the witness to a criminal 
prosecution in another juris-diction. If the 
witness still refuses to answer or produce 
the evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt 
of court and punished accordingly. If the 
witness complies with the order and he would 
have been privileged to withhold the answer 
given or the evidence produced by him except 
for this section, that person shall not be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or 
forfeiture on account of any fact or act 
concerning which, he was ordered to answer or 
produce evidence except he may nevertheless 
be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for any 
perjury, false swearing or contempt committed 
in answering, failing to answer, or for 
producing or failing to produce any evidence 
in accordance with the order. 
The powers specified in this chapter are 
in addition to any other powers granted to 
the attorney general or county attorneys. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court ruling that Utah Code Annotated § 77-22-1 
et seq. is unconstitutional and withdrawing judicial 
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authorization for an investigation conducted by the Attorney 
General's Office under the statute. The decision was entered by 
Judge Boyd Bunnell on September 20, 1984, after initially having 
authorized the criminal investigation on January 26f 1983. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 26, 1983f Seventh District Court Judge Boyd 
Bunnell authorized the Attorney General's office to conduct a 
criminal investigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-22-1 et 
seq., 1953 (as amended) (the "Act") (R. 8). The Court reviewed 
the Attorney Generalfs Affidavit of Good Cause and determined 
that it met the Actfs required showing. At that time, the Court 
further ordered that the secrecy provision found in Xd. § 77-22-3 
should apply. (R. 4). Following this grant of authority, the 
Attorney General's office issued various subpoenas during 1983 
and 1984, the majority of them directed to banks, state agencies, 
Utah Power & Light and other documents repositories. Sidney 
Baucom, Harry Blundell, David Lloyd and the custodian of the 
records at Utah Power and Light were each subpoenaed between 
February of 1983 and March of 1984. By arrangement with Mr. 
Stephen Nebeker, counsel for Utah Power and Light, these 
subpoenas were responded to with documents for the most part. 
Darcy White, Jack Eliason, Norm Maxfield, Scott 
Christensen, Dave Clement, Richard Riche, Orrin Colby and Karl 
Stott, also of Utah Power and Light, were subpoenaed in March and 
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April of 1984. Messrs. White, Eliason, Christensen and Clement 
each appeared, with counsel, and were deposed in April. 
Following their depositions, more documents were provided through 
Mr. Nebeker. Mr. Donald B. Holbrook represented Messrs. 
Maxfield, Colby and Stott. 
On April 7, 1984, however, the depositions of Norm 
Maxfield, Orrin Colby and Karl Stott were postponed to April 24th 
at the request of their attorneys. The depositions were 
postponed once more on April 24. Finally, on May 14, 1984, 
Messrs. Holbrook and Nebeker notified the State that they would 
not produce Maxfield, Stott, and Colby for depositions. On May 
25, 1984, they filed motions to quash outstanding subpoenas duces 
tecum and for protective orders. (R. 57 . 62). The Attorney 
General1s Office filed a Request for Order Requiring Testimony 
and Production of Documents at about the same time. (R. 136). 
On May 30, 1984, these motions were heard by Judge Bunnell in 
Emery County and the court at that time held the Act 
constitutional, but set forth guidelines to assure that it would 
be applied constitutionally. (R. 219). Following the hearing, 
the Court directed counsel to attempt to agree on an order for 
submission to the Court. 
On June 7, 1984, the State agreed to stipulate that 
Emery Mining Corp. could see pleadings before the court, except 
the Affidavit of Good Cause. (R. 233). On or about July 13, 
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1984 Messrs. Holbrook and Nebeker filed Motions to Reconsider 
with the courtf urging Judge Bunnell to hold the Act 
unconstitutional. (R. 255). Shortly thereafter, all outstanding 
subpoenas issued under the Emery County investigative 
authorization were withdrawn by the Attorney General's Office 
except one to the custodian of records of Emery Mining 
Corporation. 
Meanwhile, counsel for all parties attempted to reach 
an agreement concerning the Order of May 30. They were never 
able to do so. The main disagreement arose from the wording 
regarding the constitutionality of the Act. 
Mr. Nebeker nevertheless submitted his version of the 
Order to the court. (R. 361). Soon thereafter, the State filed 
a response to the motion for reconsideration. 
On July 23, 1984, attorneys from the Attorney General's 
Office and Messrs. Nebeker, Holbrook, and Wheeler stipulated that 
the Secrecy Order then in effect should be modified to allow 
counsel to exchange pleadings, motions, memoranda and other 
materials related to such pleadings and motions. (R. 342). The 
Order was signed by Judge Bunnell on July 25. 
On July 27, 1984, Mr. Nebeker filed a motion for an in 
camera inspection of the Attorney General's Affidavit of Good 
Cause and the supporting memorandum, along with a Motion in 
Opposition to the Attorney General's Motion to Vacate the Order. 
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(R. 345, 352). Mr. Holbrook filed similar motions on August 1, 
1984 (R. 368). 
On April 24, 1984, criminal charges were filed against 
L. Brent Fletcher (represented by Sumner Hatch) and Michael 
Thompson, Michael Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, and Patricia Thompson 
Bowman (represented by Mr. Max Wheeler) in the Fifth Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake Department. (R. 400). The charges in that case 
were in part based on evidence obtained under the Act. Mr. 
Fletcher filed a Motion to Join Various Motions of Other 
Defendants in the Seventh Judicial District Court on or about 
August 10, 1984 (R. 607) and Michael Thompson, Michael Ziemski, 
Bruce Conklin, and Patricia Bowman collectively filed a Motion 
for Protective Order and for Production on or about August 8, 
1984. (R. 383, 385). The Attorney Generalfs Office filed its 
opposition to these motions on September 11. (R. 707) 
On August 21, 1984, Emery Mining, through Robert Reeder 
and Francis Wikstrom, moved to quash the only outstanding 
subpoena. (R. 633). At the same time, they purported to join 
all of the motions previously filed by Messrs. Holbrook and 
Nebeker. 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held before Judge 
Bunnell in Emery County in which Messrs. Holbrook, Nebeker, 
Wheeler, Hatch, and Wikstrom presented argument on behalf of 
their respective clients. Judge Bunnell quashed the outstanding 
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subpoena to Emery Mining, held that the individuals being 
proceeded against in 5th Circuit Court were not entitled to the 
remedy they sought, but were entitled to examine the affidavit of 
good causer and took under advisement the issues as to the 
constitutionality of the Act. On September 20, 1984, Judge 
Bunnell entered his Memorandum Decision Relative to 
Constitutionality ruling that the Criminal Investigation Act (or 
Subpoena Powers Act, U.C.A. § 77-22-1 et seq.) was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was too vague and did not 
give proper protection to individual citizens against violations 
of their rights of due process and protection against self-
incrimination. He further held that the Act unconstitutionally 
allowed for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of 
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power was 
granted. (R. 734). 
Consequently, the Court dismissed the Criminal 
Investigative Proceeding and dismissed the Investigative Subpoena 
Power it previously granted to the State. (R. 734). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. Unlike a search warrant, the investigative subpoena 
does not require judicial approval before being issued. A 
citizen has the opportunity to challenge its validity, through a 
motion to quash, before compliance. This opportunity justifies 
less demanding standards than are found in the area of search and 
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seizure and establishes the lack of requirement for prior 
judicial approval of each subpoena. These requirements were 
established by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Pub, Co. v. 
Hfillinsr 327 U.S. 186 (1946): 
1) The investigation must be for a 
lawfully authorized purpose. 
2) Documents sought must be relevant to 
the inquiry. Probable cause to suspect the 
commission of a crime is unnecessary. 
3) The documents to be produced must be 
adequately described and not unduly broad or 
burdensome^. 
If a citizen feels there is a violation of these standards in his 
subpoena, he has access to the courts. The remedy of quashal is 
inherent in the judicial system and is entirely appropriate in 
the absence of further legislative directive. Because of the 
existence of an effective remedy prior to compliance, the 
Subpoena Powers Act does not allow for the "absolute abuse of 
power" found by Judge Bunnell. 
2. Although the Subpoena Powers Act requires that a 
witness be notified of his right to counsel, it is silent on the 
subject of target and self-incrimination warnings. Whether these 
warnings should be required under the Act has never been decided 
by this Court. They were impliedf howeverr into the grand jury 
setting in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967), 
which has led some to conclude that they may be implied by 
analogy here. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court 
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has never held that these warnings are required/ and in fact has 
strongly suggested that they are not. 
If these warnings are indeed required/ this Court has 
the power to imply them into the Actf as it did in Ruggeri* 
supra. There is no reason to hold the Act unconstitutional even 
if it lacks procedural protections. 
If compliance with a particular subpoena would violate 
a citizen's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rightsf the appropriate 
remedy is quashal of the subpoena/ rather than a declaration that 
the Act is unconstitutional. Furthermore/ the mere possibility 
that subpoenas may be issued which violate someone1s 
constitutional rights is not a valid reason to hold the statute 
invalid on its face. If this reasoning were adopted/ arrest/ 
search/ and all other statutes that might conceivably be applied 
in a manner such as to violate someone's constitutional rights 
must be stricken as facially invalid. 
3. The Subpoena Powers Act does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment right to due process. Judqe Bunnell ruled the Act 
unconstitutional partly on the basis that it was too vague. It 
is believed that what Judge Bunnell means by vagueness is a lack 
of procedural protection rather than insufficient notice of 
prohibited behavior/ the focus of most vagueness cases. 
The Court also held that the Act was unconstitutional 
because it contained no requirement that a citizen be informed of 
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the nature and scope of the investigation. While due process 
frequently requires that a citizen be given notice, such is not 
the case in the investigative setting. Unlike trials, 
investigations adjudicate no legal rights. There is thus no 
reason for a citizen to have notice of the nature and scope of 
the investigation. In factf providing such notice could have the 
effect of impeding the investigation, since witnesses would know 
what evidence to destroy or conceal. 
Even targets do not need this knowledge to protect 
their right against self-incrimination. Since target and self-
incrimination warnings are not constitutionally mandated, and the 
lack is not considered a violation of due process, there is no 
reason to believe that the failure to require that even more 
information be given to a witness who is not a target, is a due 
process violation. 
The most that could be required is notice of target 
status and the charges upon which a citizen is being 
investigated, as this Court held was required in Ruggeri, supra, 
for grand jury witnesses. This kind of notice, which falls far 
short of the kind required by Judge Bunnell, is sufficient for 
witnesses in investigations under the Subpoena Powers Act. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT MEETS ALL 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE 
OF INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS AND THEREFORE 
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Attorney General's rights and duties in the 
issuance of investigative subpoenas are set forth in § 77-22-2f 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended. 
(1) In any matter involving the 
investigation of a crime, the existence of a 
crime or malfeasance in office or any 
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney 
general or any county attorney shall have the 
right, upon application and approval of the 
district court, for good cause shown, to 
conduct an investigation in which the 
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel 
their attendance and testimony under oath 
before any certified court reporter, and 
require the production of books- papers, 
documents, recordings and any other items 
which constitute evidence or may be relevant 
to the investigation in the judgment of the 
attorney general or county attorney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the 
names of possible defendants and need only 
contain notification that the testimony of 
the witness is sought in aid of criminal 
investigation and state the time and place of 
the examination, which may be conducted 
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the 
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform 
the party served that he is entitled to be 
represented by counsel. Witness fees and 
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county 
attorney may make written application to any 
district court and the court may order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be held in 
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secret; that such proceeding be secret; and 
that the record of testimony be kept secret 
unless and until the court for good cause 
otherwise orders. The court may order 
excluded from any investigative hearing or 
proceeding any persons except the attorneys 
representing the state and members of their 
staffs, the court reporter and the attorney 
for the witness. 
The Act provides for judicial review at the outset of 
the investigation by requiring the investigatory body to go 
before a district court judge with an affidavit of good cause 
detailing the need for an investigation. If the judge determines 
that good cause for the investigation existsf the investigatory 
body may proceed to issue subpoenas to obtain relevant 
information. 
In spite of this initial requirement of judicial 
intervention. Judge Bunnell held the Act unconstitutional 
primarily because he felt it does not provide sufficient judicial 
review. It is curious that Judqe Bunnell reached this conclusion 
after complaining that the Act caused "so much burden on the 
Court to police it" in the hearing of May 30th (T. 1 at 48), but 
he nevertheless thereafter maintained that he was concerned about 
the lack of judicial review after the investigation was 
authorized, which allowed "an absolute abuse of power." (Order, 
page 4). By way of illustrating the alleged abuse. Judge Bunnell 
offered examples of two subpoenas issued by the Attorney 
General's Office, one which he felt was over broad, and one which 
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he felt was beyond the scope of the investigation. Judge Bunnell 
apparently believed that additional guidelines and limitations on 
the use of the subpoena power are necessary to insure that there 
would be no violations of a citizen1s constitutional rights. 
Judge Bunnell did not elaborate as to the extent of 
judicial review necessary, but he implied that review of each 
subpoena would be warranted; less than that level of review could 
hardly provide more protection than the present system, which 
allows review whenever the respondent is dissatisfied with the 
terms of the subpoena. Even if Judge Bunnell felt that a lower 
level of review would be adequate, the procedure he leans toward 
is closer to that required for search warrants than it is to the 
procedure required for investigative subpoenas. 
It is important to compare, then, the procedures 
involved for the search warrant and the subpoena and to determine 
why differences exist in the constitutional requirements for 
each. To justify the intrusion of a search warrant, the 
government must go before a judge and demonstrate that probable 
cause exists prior to executing the warrant. See, e.g., § 77-23-
3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended. The investigative 
subpoena, on the other hand, requires no individual approval once 
the investigation has been approved by the judge after the good 
cause showing. 
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The difference in procedure has a rational basis, which 
was explained by the court in Stanford Daily v. zurcher. 353 
F.Supp. 124 (N.D.Cal. 1972): 
A subpoena duces tecum . . . is much 
less intrusive than a search warrant: the 
police do not go rummaging through one's 
homer office, or desk if armed with only a 
subpoena. Andf perhaps equally important, 
there is no opportunity to challenge the 
search warrant, whereas one can always move 
to quash the subpoena before producing the 
sought after material. 
A case very similar to the one at bar cites Stanford 
Daily with approval, and goes further in establishing the error 
of Judge Bunnell's ruling. In State v. Tsavaris. 394 So. 2d 418 
(Fla. 1981), a state's attorney served a subpoena duces tecum on 
Dr. Tsavaris1 secretary seeking the doctor's records in 
connection with a murder investigation. Dr. Tsavaris moved to 
suppress the records based on alleged violation of his fourth 
amendment rights and he further alleged it was necessary that the 
subpoena duces tecum be issued by a detached magistrate. After 
discussinq United States Supreme Court precedent, the Florida 
Supreme Court stated simply: 
The fourth amendment does not require 
that a subpoena duces tecum be issued by a 
detached magistrate as Tsavaris now suggests. 
394 So. 2d at 426. The court noted the difference between search 
warrants and subpoenas duces tecum and the availability of a pre-
compliance remedy in relation to the latter: 
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Subpoenas duces tecum are different from 
search warrants and are indisputably less 
intrusive. While there is no opportunity to 
challenge a search warrant, a subpoena duces 
tecum is subject to a motion to quash prior 
to the production of the requested materials. 
Id. at 427. See also In re Horowitz. 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) 
cert, denied 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Fisher v. United States. 425 
U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1976). 
It is the opportunity to move the court to quash the 
subpoena before compliance which provides the critical protection 
against abuse or mistake. The mandatory judicial review of the 
search warrant thus finds its counterpart in the permissive 
review, via a motion to quash, inherent in the investigative 
subpoena process. Moreover, the opportunity to challenge a 
subpoena before compliance provides a person with greater 
protection than the search warrant requirement. La Fave, Search 
and Seizure. § 4.13. 
The only way an investigatory body could abuse its 
power would be to remove a citizen's right to judicial review. 
As long as this avenue remains open to a citizen, however, as it 
has here, any attempts to circumvent constitutional rights will 
be thwarted by the court upon motion. As pointed out by the 
court in Tsavaris. £A1E£3* if a witness appears in response to 
defective process and fails to object before compliance he has 
waived any right to object to the defects later. 394 So. 2d at 
425. 
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The procedure of seeking quashal or protective orders 
was followed by those subpoenaed in the instant case. The 
allegedly defective subpoenas issued by the Attorney General's 
Office were challenged prior to compliance and one was quashed.1 
Even if it were the Attorney General's Offices' avowed purpose to 
violate constitutional rightsr the most that it could do would be 
to attempt to do so. The citizen's ability to invoke the aid of 
the court acts as an effective shield against abuse. 
If an investigative subpoena is issued or executed in a 
manner that does not allow re-compliance challenge, it might run 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. In re Nwamu. 421 F.Supp. 1361 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). This feature of the investigative subpoena was 
discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case 
of Oklahoma Press Pub, Co, v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), 
recently cited with approval in Donovan v. Lone Steer Inc., 104 
S.Ct 769 (1984) In Donovan, the petitioner, who had been served 
with a subpoena under the Fair Labor Standards Actf argued that 
enforcement would subject them to inconvenience, expense, and 
harassment. The Court replied as follows: 
1
 Judge Bunnell implied in his Memorandum Decision Relative to 
Constitutionality that the subpoenas withdrawn by the Attorney 
General's Office when challenged were acknowledged to have been 
abusive of constitutional rights. That implication is completely 
improper, since the subpoenas were withdrawn because the 
information requested was not needed at that time and was not 
worth fighting over in court at that stage of the investigation. 
Judge Bunnell did not rule that those subpoenas violated anyone's 
constitutional rights. 
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. . . There is no harassment when the 
subpoena is issued and enforced according to 
law. The Administrator is authorized to 
enter and inspect, but the Act makes his 
rights to do so subject in all cases to 
judicial supervision. Persons from whom he 
seeks relevant information are not required 
to submit to his demands, if in any respect 
it is unreasonable or overreaches the 
authority Congress has given. To it they may 
make "appropriate defense" surrounded by 
every safeguard of judicial restraint. 
Id. at 217 
The opportunity to challenge a subpoena is inherent in 
Utah's Act. Indeed, the challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Act arose in hearings regarding several motions to quash 
subpoenas issued under the Act. Citizens are thus clothed with 
the protection of the court under the Subpoena Powers Act. 
An opportunity to challenge the subpoena before 
compliance justifies a less demanding standard than probable 
cause. Hailing/ supjiar established the standards which govern 
subpoenas issued by administrative agencies, grand juries, 
prosecutors, and legislative committees. La Pave, jSJiEJLa* § 4.13. 
HLallina is also applicable to investigation conducted by the 
Attorney General, since investigatory subpoenas are equated with 
administrative subpoenas. In re Investigation No, 2 of 
Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 577 P.2d 414 
(N. Mex. 1978). 
In BLalLing, the Court framed the issue as one of 
"balancing the public interest against private security" and held 
that the "gist of the protection is the requirement that the 
disclosures sought shall not be unreasonable." 
The Court provided three guidelines discussing the 
requirement of reasonableness: 
1) No specific crime need be charged, 
but the investigation must be for a lawfully 
authorized purpose, within the power of 
Congress to demand. 
2) Probable cause to suspect the 
commission of a crime is unnecessary. The 
subpoena is valid if the documents sought are 
relevant to the inquiry. 
3) The requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant clause of a particular 
description of the person or item to be 
seized requires only that subpoenas contain a 
specification of the documents to be produced 
adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes 
of the relevant inquiry. 
Each of these requirements will be discussed at length 
below. 
1) Authorized purpose of investigation 
Grand juries have broad authority to issue subpoenas, 
and judicial restrictions are minimal. See, e.g., Blair v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919). 
Administrative agencies have a similarly broad authority. The 
Supreme Court has sanctioned the broad investigatory power of 
administrative agencies, equating agency powers with the powers 
the Grand Jury, (which) . . • can 
investigate merely on suspicion that the law 
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is being violated, or even just because it 
wants assurance that it is not. When 
investigative and accusatory duties are 
delegated by statute to an administrative 
bodyf it . . • may take steps to inform 
itself as to whether there is a probable 
violation of the law 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 
L.Ed. 401 (1950). 
This sanctioning of broad authority is reflected in our 
own statute. which provides that 
In any matter involving the 
investigation of a crimeP the existence of a 
crime or malfeasance in office or any 
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney 
general or any county attorney shall have the 
right . . . to conduct an investigation . . . 
S 77-22-2(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953 (as 
amended) (emphasis added). 
The only limitation existing in this statute is that crime or 
malfeasance in office be investigated. Therefore, unless a 
citizen can show that the investigation concerned a purely civil 
matter, it is extremely difficult to challenge the scope of an 
investigation. A party challenging the subpoena must make a 
clear showing that the investigation is ultra vires or for an 
illegitimate purpose. See, e.g., in re Borden Co.. 75 F.Supp. 
857 (N.D. 111. 1948). In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Addressed to Certain Executive Officers of the M.G. Allen & 
Assocs.. Inc. 391 F.Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 1975). 
Judge Bunnell was apparently concerned that the 
Attorney General's Office used its power improperly by using 
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evidence obtained through criminal investigations for civil 
purposes. (See Memorandum Decision. R. 736, 737). He charged 
that a civil anti-trust case filed in Salt Lake City was based at 
least partially on information derived from the criminal 
investigation. The Attorney General's Office denied these 
allegations in the September 12th hearing (T-2 at p. 94) . and 
agreed that it would refrain from using any information obtained 
under the Act in that case or for any other civil purpose. 
Judge Bunnell made these allegations and imposed this 
duty upon the Attorney General's office without any showing that 
the investigation was conducted for an illegitimate purpose, as 
the case law requires. It is also important to noter although 
the point will not be belabored here, that there is no reason why 
an absolute prohibition of the use of this kind of information 
outside of the criminal case should be made. Its use may 
naturally be conditioned on the observance of appropriate secrecy 
orders. 
As long as the primary purpose of a subpoena is to 
gather criminal evidence, civil evidence acquired along the way 
need not be disregarded. See United States v. Procter & Gamble. 
356 U.S. 677 (1958). The Supreme Court recently held in united 
State Y, Sells Engineering! Inc.r 103 s.ct. 3133 (19R3) that 
attorneys in the Civil Division of the Justice Department may 
gain access to grand jury materials for use in civil suits if 
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they obtained a court order authorizing such access after 
establishing a "particularized need" for the materials. 
2) Relevancg 
The second standard suggested in walling is the 
requirement that the subpoenaed documents be relevant to the 
inquiry. Where the evidence sought by subpoena is not plainly 
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the agency, it 
is the duty of the court to order its production for 
consideration by the agency. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 
317 U.S. 501 (1943). The burden of proving relevance is simply a 
showing that each general category of subpoenaed documents bears 
some possible relationship to the investigation. See In Re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Certain Executive Officers 
fif-the Ht G. Allen & Associates,. Inc., 391 F.Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 
1975)? State Pept- of Revenue yt ptR, Johnson Lumber Q Q . , 617 
P.2d 603 (Or. 1980)f Donovan v. Shaw. 668 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 
1982). Anti-trust investigations typically require virtually no 
showing of relevance, and broad sweeping subpoenas are enforced: 
. . . because of the numerous and varied 
activities which may constitute substantive 
violations lof the antitrust laws] grand jury 
investigations seeking to ascertain the 
probable existence of such violations must be 
given the broadest scope possible." 
-EfeOjjIe^ v^ t^ JloxXr 47 111. 2d 458, 265 N.E. 2d 601 (1970). 
The focus of the t e s t of relevance i s not whether 
irrelevant material may be seized, but whether relevant documents 
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are subpoenaed. See United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp 857 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) . 
The burden of proof cannot be made any higher, since an 
investigation can only deal in possibilities of a suspected 
violation. The investigator generally has no knowledqe of the 
contents of the documents. The required showing must therefore 
be "light, indeed very light." In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces 
Tecum Addressed to Certain Officers of the M. G. Allen & Assocsf 
IrXC., 391 F.Supp. 791 (D.R.I. 1975). 
The relevancy requirement is incorporated into the Act. 
§ 77-22-2(1) allows items "which constitute evidence or may be 
relevant to the investigation." 
3) The Adequate Specification Requirement 
The third requirement elaborated in Walling is that the 
subpoena contain "a specification of the documents to be produced 
adequatef but not excessivef for the purposes of the relevant 
inquiry." This requirement has two prongs. First, the subpoena 
must contain a sufficiently definite description of the documents 
so that a person can understand which documents must be produced. 
Secondf the subpoena must not be so broad that compliance with 
its terms is unduly burdensome, pope & Talbot, inc. £, iJmithr 
340 P.2d 960 (Or. 1959). As with the relevancy requirement, the 
burden of persuasion of establishing that a subpoena inadequately 
specifies documents is on the party challenging the subpoena. In 
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Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Addressed to Certain Executive Officers 
of the M. G. Allen & Assocs.. Inc.
 P sums* It should be noted 
that none of the respondents to this appeal cited any authority 
nor made any showing to meet the burden set by the case law ,in 
the lower court. 
The first prong of the requirement, that the subpoena 
contain a definite description- is easily met. The courts 
generally do not require greater specificity than is within the 
knowledge of the investigative body. In re Eastman Kodak £e., 7 
F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y 1947). 
The second prong, that the subpoena cannot be unduly 
broad or unburdensome, is frequently litigated. The objections 
are usually based on the quantity of documents demanded and the 
period of time which the documents cover. The courts consider 
several factors to determine whether a subpoena is unduly broad 
and burdensome. First, the scope of the investigation helps 
determine the volume of documents that must be produced. The 
broader or more complex the investigation* the broader the 
permissible scope of the subpoenas. Second, the Courts consider 
the probability that the records will reveal evidence helpful to 
the investigation. Finally, the courts consider the financial or 
economic burden that compliance would impose on the subpoenaed 
party. The larger the business enterprise, the greater the 
volume of documents that may be subpoenaed. La Fave. Search and 
££iziir£, § 4.13. 
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Judge Bunnell found that one subpoena served upon the 
custodian of records of Emery Mining Company was too broad "in 
any investigation of any criminal activity" (Order, page 2). 
Judqe Bunnell did not specify how the subpoena was overbroad nor 
was any argument advanced by Emery Mining as to why the subpoena 
failed to meet the standard, but it seems unlikely that a request 
for employee records for a five year period would fail the above 
test, considering the size of Emery Mining and the nature of 
investigation involved. The affidavit of Wayne L. Wickizer, (R. 
5-8) which constituted the original showing of good cause to 
conduct this investigationf mentioned "payoffs of U.P. & L. and 
Emery Mining Co. personnel" and "Diversion of U.P. & L. funds for 
the benefit of U.P. & L. and Emery Mining Co. officials". The 
personnel records would have been relevant in investigating these 
allegations and the lower court erred in quashing the subpoena 
without any showing of violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Emery 
Mining Co. did not contest the argument that the custodian of 
their records could not assert a Fifth Amendment protection 
concerning the subpoena duces tecum that was quashed (T-2 at p. 
96). 
Because of the inherent, and in this case frequently 
used- protection provided by access to the courts, and the 
limitations and guidelines expressed in the Act, the Act is 
facially constitutional. The fears expressed by Judge Bunnell 
that insufficient judicial review exists are unfounded. 
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It should be kept in mind that the Act provides the 
same amount of judicial review that is given in our grand jury 
statutef § 77-11-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as 
amended. This level of judicial review is apparently sufficient 
in the grand jury situation, which is similar to the process 
under the Subpoena Powers Actr and offers no mane pre-compliance 
protection of witnesses1 rights. 
What Judqe Bunnell in effect ruled is that the 
legislature may not authorize these kinds of investigations, 
which necessarily permit a certain amount of discretion that the 
courts will not automatically have the chance to review. The 
courts, however, do not have the authority to make such a 
determination. As the Supreme Court said in Hilling, 
. . . to deny the validity of the orders 
would be in effect to deny not only 
Congress1s power to enact the provisions 
sustaining them, but also its authority to 
investigate violations of its own laws, if 
not perhaps also its own power to make such 
i nvesti gati ons. 
Walling. £iipra, at 201. 
POINT II 
THE LACK OF EXPLICIT REQUIREMENTS THAT 
TARGETS BE WARNED OF THEIR STATUS AND THEIR 
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS DOES NOT RENDER THE 
SUBPOENA POWERS ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Section 77-22-2(3), Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as 
amended, contains a list of information which must be given to 
the witness: 
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The subpoena need not disclose the names 
of possible defendants and need only contain 
notification that the testimony of the 
witness is sought in aid of criminal 
investigation and state the time and place of 
the examinationr which may be conducted 
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the 
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform 
the party served that he is entitled to be 
represented by counsel. Witness fees and 
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
Although the Act requires that a witness be notified of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counself it makes no mention of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Judge Bunnell held 
that the Act was unconstitutional because it did not protect 
citizens from violations of this right. 
There is no question that a witness may invoke his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before a grand 
jury or an investigatory body. See In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 
(1957). This rule was applied to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) , where the 
Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition applied before a one-
person grand jury. Xd. at 11. 
Whether the witness must be warned in advance of this 
right in the investigatory setting- however, is not so clear. 
There is no Utah case which discusses the issue, and the Act is 
silent in this regard, requiring only that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel be explicitly given. 
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On the federal level, there appears to be no 
requirement that a grand jury witness receive a Fifth Amendment 
warning. While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
the issue, this conclusion may be reached from an analysis of two 
cases. The first of these is United States v. Mandujano. 425 
U.S. 564 (1976). In Mandujano. the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether Hixanda warnings must be given to a grand jury witness 
who is called to testify about criminal activities in which he 
may have been personally involved. The Court concluded that 
there was no requirement that the Miranda warning be given to a 
witness appearing before a grand jury. The reasoning of the 
Court was based on two premises. First, the Hiramla warning by 
its nature is inapplicable to the grand jury process. The 
individual does not have an absolute right to remain silent. 
Second, the court was unpersuaded that a grand jury hearing is 
comparable to police interrogation. The abuses that the Miranda 
warning was aimed at curing do not occur in the grfend jury 
setting. Mandujano. however, cannot stand for the proposition 
that no advice at all need be given, simply because advice was 
given. 
The second case, United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 
97 S.Ct. 1823, 52 L.Ed. 2d (1977) helps to clarify the issue. In 
Hens, the Court ruled that a grand jury witness was properly 
convicted of perjury even though, prior to her grand jury 
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testimony, she was inadequately warned of her Fifth Amendment 
privilege. She did not understand enough English to comprehend 
the warning. 
The Wong case comes closer than any other to the 
position that no warning need be given. Yet even after Wong, the 
Supreme Court refused to say that no warning need be given. The 
following statement came a short time later in United States v. 
Washington. 431 U.S. 181 (1977): 
. . . this Court has not decided that 
the grand jury setting presents coercive 
elements which compel witnesses to 
incriminate themselves. Nor have we decided 
whether any Fifth Amendment warnings whatever 
are constitutionally required for grand jury 
witnesses; moreover, we have no occasion to 
decide these matters today . . . 
Xd. at 186. 
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts, unlike the Supreme Court, 
have expressly stated that the grand jury witness is not entitled 
to be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination United 
States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1967); United States 
v- Cleary, 265 F.*2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 
936 (1959). 
Although the Court in Washington refused to decide the 
matter of Fifth Amendment warnings, it did address the issue of 
whether a witness need be informed if he is a target. The Court 
reached the following conclusion: 
Respondent points out that unlike one 
subject to custodial interrogation, whose 
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arrest should inform him only too clearly 
that he is a potential criminal defendant a 
grand jury witness may well be unaware that 
he is targeted for possible prosecution. 
While this may be so in some situations, it 
is an overdrawn generalization. In any case, 
events here clearly put respondent on notice 
that he was a suspect in the motorcycle theft 
• • • 
However, all of this is largely 
irrelevant, since we do not understand what 
constitutional disadvantage a failure to give 
potential defendant warnings could possibly 
inflict on a grand jury witness, whether or 
not he has received other warnings. It is 
firmly settled that the prospect of being 
indicted does not entitle a witness to commit 
perjury, and witnesses who are not grand jury 
targets are protected from compulsory self-
incrimination to the same extent as those who 
are. Because target witness status neither 
enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional 
protection against compelled self-
incrimination, potential defendant warnings 
add nothing of value to protection of Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
13. at 188-189. 
The circuit courts are split on the question of whether 
target warnings must be given. The Second Circuit, for example, 
has affirmed the suppression of perjured grand jury testimony 
because of the failure to warn the witness that he was a putative 
defendant. United States v. Jacobs. 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), 
cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978). The Third Circuit, on the 
other hand, has declined to follow this line of thought. United 
States v. Crocker. 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977). 
An approach taken by the Justice Department is to give 
the warning despite the lack of a clear constitutional mandate. 
See 9 United States Attorneys' Manual § 11-250. 
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Both this Court and the Utah State Legislature, 
howeverf have made it clear that target warnings are required, at 
least with respect to State grand juries. In State v. Ruggeri. 
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.3d 969 (Utah 1967), this Court held that a 
potential defendant, a target, called before a grand jury was 
entitled to a warning of his Fifth Amendment privilege and to the 
fact that he is a target. He must be warned of the charcres on 
which he is being investigated. 
Justice Ellett required that these warnings be given 
because of his determination that a target is an "accused" within 
the meaning of the Constitution. It follows that when the target 
was detained in any significant way, he must be warned of his 
status and of the charges being considered against him. "To fail 
to so warn one so being investigated is to entrap him and to 
violate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 
Ruggeri. SU£I£, at 973. 
Although Justice Ellett correctly recited the law in 
respect to custodial settings, his determination that a target 
appearing before a grand jury was in custody was erroneous. As 
the Supreme Court later clearly stated in Mandujano. jsiipxa, 
. . .[The Miranda! warnings were aimed 
at the evils seen by the Court as endemic to 
police interrogation of a person in custody. 
Miranda, addressed extrajudicial confession 
or admission procured in a hostile, 
unfamiliar environment which lacks procedural 
safeguards. The decision expressly rested on 
the privilege against compulsory self-
-32-
incrimination the prescribed warnings sought 
to negate the "compulsion" thought to be 
inherent in police station interrogation. 
But the Miranda court simply did not perceive 
judicial inquiries and custodial 
interrogations as equivalents: "iTlhe 
compulsion to speak in the isolated setting 
of the police station may well be greater 
than in courts or other official 
investigations/ where there are often 
impartial observers to guard against 
intimidation or trickery" 834 U.S., at 461. 
Ruggeri
 f thenf mandated strong protection of witnesses before the 
grand jury on the false belief that they were constitutionally 
required. 
In spite of the intervening Mandujano decision which 
made i t clear that no warnings were necessary in the grand jury 
set t ing , the Utah Legislature codified the Rugerri rule in 1980. 
Section 77-11-3(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), 
provides that a witness must be advised of his right to counsel, 
but if he becomes a target , he shall be advised of that fact and 
of the right against self- incrimination. Utah case law and 
statute thus provide a s ignif icantly greater amount of protection 
than the federal rules for a target tes t i fy ing before a grand 
jury. 
Because this Court and the leg i s la ture have given 
witnesses the right to target and self-incrimination warnings in 
the grand jury set t ing , the same rights could be applied by 
analogy to investigations under the Subpoena Powers Act. Another 
alternative, however, would be to give the self-incrimination 
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warning only if the witness decided against the assistance of 
counsel. This is the approach the State of Washington has taken 
for both grand jury and special inquiry investigations: 
Any individual called to testify before 
a grand jury or special inquiry judge, 
whether as a witness or principal if not 
represented by an attorney appearing with the 
witness before the grand jury or special 
inquiry judge, must be told of his privilege 
against self-incrimination. Such an 
individual has a right to representation by 
an attorney to advise him of his rights, 
obligations and duties before the grand jury 
or special inquiry judge, and must be 
informed o£ this right. 
W.CA § 10.27.120. 
Apparently, the framers of this statute felt that a witness would 
be equally protected by a self-incrimination warning or 
representation by counsel who would naturally warn him of this 
right. This kind of thinking may have been what our legislature 
had in mind when they required only the right to counsel warning 
on subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers Act. 
Judge Bunnell ruled the Act unconstitutional in spite 
of the fact that in the May 30th hearing, he held that the Act 
would be given the presumption of constitutionality providing the 
State Prosecutors inform witnesses whether or not they were 
targets of the investigation. The State agreed to do so, and 
since the date of the ruling, has consistently complied with this 
procedure. 
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Implying t h i s procedure in to the Act should have 
s e t t l e d the i s sue of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . I t surfaced again, 
however, in the Order of September 20th, when Judge Bunnell found 
the Act to be uncons t i tu t iona l , p a r t i a l l y on the b a s i s of the 
lack of express standards on s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . To i l l u s t r a t e 
the perceived e v i l s which spring from the lack of an express 
standard, Judge Bunnell d iscussed the S t a t e ' s handling of the 
depos i t ion of L. Brent F le tcher . Fletcher was deposed in May of 
1983, during the early s tages of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a f u l l 
year prior t o Judge Bunnel l ' s May 30 , 19 84 ru l ing . Fletcher was 
not informed that he was a t a r g e t , although he did have h i s 
attorney with him. Neither Fletcher nor h i s attorney at any time 
requested any warning or objected to h i s g iving testimony without 
i t . (R. 508-509) . Mr. Fletcher did dec l ine t o answer some 
ques t ions . 
The Fletcher depos i t ion cannot be considered an example 
of the S t a t e ' s a l l eged "abuse" of c i t i z e n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s 
or as a v i o l a t i o n of the May 30th rul ing , s ince the depos i t ion 
was taken prior to that order. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , then, that 
Judge Bunnell should point t o that part icular inc ident as a cause 
of the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y dec i s ion when he had cured any a l leged 
problem by implying the necessary procedures i n t o the Act on May 
30th. 
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There are only two possible reasons which Judge Bunnell 
thought justified reversal: 1) either he did not originally have 
the authority to imply the procedures into the Act, or 2) the 
possibility that the State may have violated the Order after it 
was given (although the State knows of no such incident) making 
the Act unconstitutional in its application (see Memorandum 
Decision, R. 736-737). 
It must be mentioned at the outset that the Court has a 
duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute if at all 
possible. Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978), cert, denied 
98 S.Ct. 2822, 436 D.S. 927. The presumption of 
constitutionality of a statute transcends its destruction unless 
the latter so obviously is obsessed with cupidity and unreason as 
to have no substantial basis for its existence. Norton v. Dept. 
of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 24, 447 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968). 
The purpose of the Act is to aid criminal investigators § 77-22-
1, Utah Code Ann, 1953 (as amended). It strengthens and enhances 
the State1s ability to detect and eliminate criminal activity. 
The Act is especially important in white-collar crime 
investigations, where proof of criminal activity requires 
examination of voluminous documents. The Act should therefore be 
upheld. An easily corrected procedural problem, if it is found 
to be a problem, should not be grounds for ruling the Act 
unconstitutional. The statute should be held valid unless there 
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is clear, complete and unmistakable violation of some specific 
provision of the constitution. Sims v. Smith. 571 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1977) . 
With this strong presumption of constitutionality in 
mind, it must next be asked whether a judge has the authority to 
impose procedural requirements for application of a statute. 
Although a court cannot supply omissions in a statute which are 
of a substantive nature, £££, e.g.. In Re Barnettfs Estate. 275 
P. 453 (Cal. 1929), it may supply procedures. While the power to 
create substantive rights is a legislative power, the authority 
to enact procedures to implement those rights is judicial. 
Thomas v. State. 566 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977). The court not only 
has the right, but also the duty, to supply necessary procedures 
to implement legislative enactments. Farris v. Cannon. 649 P.2d 
529 (Okla. 1982). See also fiydd v. State Bd. of Health. 451 P.2d 
239 (Kan. 1969). 
There is no question that Utah courts may imply 
procedures as well. State v. Ruageri. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 
969 (Utah 1967) is an excellent example of a procedure being 
implied into a statute. In Ruggeri. this Court held, among other 
things, that a person being in/ostigated by a grand jury must be 
informed if he is a target. The Court made that determination, 
rather than finding the grand jury statu< ? unconstitutional 
because of a lack of procedural requirements intended to 
guarantee a witness1 constitutional rights. 
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Judge Bunnell obviously had the authority to supply the 
procedure of informing targets of their status if he felt it was 
necessary to insure constitutional application of the Act. This 
is especially true when it is considered along with another rule 
of construction, that the court has a duty to render an 
interpretation of the laws as will best promote protection of 
the public. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 
(Utah 1978); £fcat£ Xx^Hnnit 13 Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d 261 (1962). 
The conclusion which must be drawn from these rules is 
that if the target warning was indeed necessary to save the 
constitutionality of the Actf Judge Bunnell acted correctly in 
the first instance (i.e. in his May 30th ruling). No reason 
existed for him to reverse that decision. 
If the judge had a change of heart because of some 
perceived abuse of rights that the State initiated after the 
ruling on May 30th, he did not mention where it was. He did 
mention, however, the concept of the Act being unconstitutional 
as applied. 
The problem with this reasoning is that the remedy for 
a single violation of a witness1 Fifth Amendment right is, in 
some appropriate circumstances, the suppression of evidence, not 
a determination that the statute under which the violation took 
place is unconstitutional. £ae, e.g.. State v» Ruggeri, £ U B U « 
The United States Supreme Court made the same point in In Ee 
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GUQban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). Groban concerned the rights of 
witnesses under an investigation conducted by a fire marshall. 
The Supreme Court states that; 
Possibility of improper exercise of 
opportunity to examine is not in our judgment 
a sound reason to set aside a State's 
procedure for fire prevention. As in similar 
situation, abuse may be corrected as they 
arise, for example, by excluding from 
subsequent prosecutions evidence improperly 
obtained. Groban at 381. 
Similarly,^ the remedy for the single violation of a 
citizen's Fourth Amendment right is not a ruling that the Act 
under which the violation occurred is unconstitutional. Instead, 
it is the suppression of evidence, if the violation is 
substantial and not in good faith, § 77-35-12(g), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Therefore, no matter what the reasoning behind Judqe 
Bunnell's decision to hold the Act unconstitutional on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, the decision was an inappropriate response to 
the alleged problem. Following Judge Bunnell's apparent 
reasoning, search warrant statutes should also be invalidated 
because they allow the possibility of disregard for Fourth 
Amendment Rights. When faced with a similar problem concerning 
in-custody interrogation, the United States Supreme Court in 
Miranda v. Arizonar 384 U.S. 436 (1966) did not hesitate to 
fashion procedural requirements for warning people of their Fifth 
Amendment rights; the now-famous "Miranda warning". Judqe 
Bunnell's i n i t i a l ruling in th i s case followed the same approach, 
but his reversal of that ruling on September 20, 19 84 i s not 
log ica l ly or lega l ly supported. 
POINT III 
THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE A CITIZEN1S FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In his Memorandum Decision of September 20, 1984, Judge 
Bunnell held that the Act is unconstitutional because it does not 
give proper protection to individual citizens against violation 
of their right to due process. He stated that the Act was too 
vague, and furthermore, that it did not allow a citizen to have 
notice of the kind of investigation being conducted. (R. 736, 
737). Although it is generally understood that vagueness is the 
lack of sufficient notice, it is believed that Judge Bunnell 
could not properly have referred to vagueness in this sense. 
Rather, he felt that the Act was vague in that it contained 
insufficient procedural protection (discussed in Points I and II, 
SilEia). Vagueness is an inappropriate way to characterize any 
perceived problem with the statute. 
The theory that a vague statute may violate due process 
due to want of adequate notice has application only where there 
is regulation or a sanction for conduct. CAVCO Industries v. 
Industrial Commission of Arizona, 631 p.2d 1087 (Ariz. 1981). 
since the Act at issue is not concerned with sanctions, vagueness 
is not properly an issue before the court. 
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Judge Bunnell also held the Act unconstitutional 
because i t did not require a witness to be given notice of tne 
nature and scope of the investigation. He perceived th i s lack of 
procedure as a v io lat ion of a witness1 right to due process of 
law. Judge Bunnell's concerns, however, are groundless. The due 
process requirements for investigations are sat i s f ied by the 
Subpoena Powers Act, 
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that due process requires at minimum that a c i t izen be given 
notice of the charges against him and an opportunity for a 
hearing. See, e . g . , Twining v« New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 
(1908). At the same time, however, the Courts have been 
unwilling to hold that notice and a hearing are such essential 
elements of due process that they are required in a l l 
circumstances: 
The very nature of due process negates 
any concept of inf lexible procedures 
applicable to every imaginable s i tuation. 
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v« HcElroyr 367 u.s. 
886, 895 (1961). As one commentator pointed out, the Court has 
continually insisted that the procedures needed to minimize error 
and to reduce the dangers of arbitrary action to an acceptable 
level vary "according to specific factual contexts." Hannah v. 
L&LSh&i 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), since "not all situations 
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of 
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procedure." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-10 (1978). 
what process is due in the investigative setting has 
been addressed by the Supreme Court on several occasions. The 
Court recently discussed the issue of notice in S.E.C. v. Jerry 
T. O'Brien. 104 S.Ct. 2720, (1984). In O'Brien, the S.E.C. 
issued subpoenas for financial records to third parties during 
its investigation of respondents. Respondents sought notice of 
the third party subpoenas. They argued that they had a due 
process right to such notice in order to protect their own 
rights. The Court disagreed, however, holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not implicated because 
an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights: 
The opinion of the Court in Hannah v. 
Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), leaves no doubt 
that neither the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment nor the confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment is offended when a 
federal administrative agency, without 
notifying a person under investigation, uses 
its subpoena power to gather evidence adverse 
to him. The Due Process Clause is not 
implicated under such circumstances because 
an administrative investigation adjudicates 
no legal rights . . . 
Q'Brien, AUSI&F at 2725. 
Although O'Brien aeals primarily with notice to targets 
when subpoenas are issued to third parties, the holding that due 
process is not implicated in investigations because they 
adjudicate no legal rights has broad application which covers the 
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in s tant case . Lower court opinions share the Supreme Court's 
holding that due process does not require an administrat ive 
agency t o provide subpoenaed wi tnes se s with not ice of the purpose 
and/or scope of an adminis trat ive i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Federal Savings 
and Loan Ins , Corp, v . F i r s t National Development Corp.. 497 
F.Supp. 724 (D.C. Tex. 1980) . 
u'Brien a l so s ta ted important pol icy cons iderat ions 
behind the lacK of a n o t i c e requirement. Notice would 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y aid the a b i l i t y of t a r g e t s who have something t o 
hide t o impede l e g i t i m a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . I d . at p. 2730. I t 
would a l so have the e f f e c t of lay ing bare the i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
a u t h o r i t y ' s knowledge and i n t e n t i o n s midway through the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
This opinion was echoed in Pepsi Co, v. S .E .C. , 56 3 
F.Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) . 
TO impose a n o t i f i c a t i o n requirement on the 
S.E.C. would n e c e s s a r i l y permit a l l 
t a r g e t s — and presumably a l l po tent ia l 
t a r g e t s — e f f e c t i v e l y t o monitor the course 
and conduct of agency i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
Experience and common sense should e s t a b l i s h 
tha t such a power would be great ly abused. 
The kind of n o t i f i c a t i o n discussed in O'Brien would be 
much l e s s informative to a targe t than the more de ta i l ed 
requirement previously ordered by Judge Bunnell , y e t the Supreme 
Court s t i l l found i t to be a dangerous p o l i c y . Judge Bunnel l ' s 
contention that a target must know the nature and scope of an 
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i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o protect h i s own r i g h t s i s therefore i l l - f o u n d e d . 
Such knowledge, in the hands of a t a r g e t f would have the e f f e c t 
of emasculating the e n t i r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
I t i s a l so important to compare Judge Bunnel l ' s order 
with what i s required under the S t a t e ' s grand jury s t a t u t e . In 
State v, Ruggeri, &U£X£, t h i s Court held that a target must be 
advised of the charges against him then under cons iderat ion . 
Such knowledge adequately enabled a target to protect h i s r i g h t s . 
The Court did not require the grand jury t o reveal the scope and 
nature of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . There i s no reason why, then, in 
t h i s s imi lar type of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , that the Attorney General's 
Office should d i s c l o s e such extens ive information* The advice 
required under Ruggeri should be the most that i s given in any 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
judge Bunnell , however, went much further in attempting 
to provide protec t ion t o wi tnesses in the May 30th hearing by 
requiring S ta te prosecutors t o inform wi tnesses of the nature of 
the matter under i n v e s t i g a t i o n and of the scope of the 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n . Since Judge Bunnell did not l i m i t t h i s 
requirement t o t a r g e t s , i t presumably app l i e s to non-targets as 
w e l l . Yet there i s no reason why a non-target in part icu lar 
would need t h i s information. I t could, in f a c t , cause problems 
with secrecy prov i s ions ( in addi t ion t o impeding the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) because the information could be re leased to a 
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potentially large group of witnesses which might include criminal 
suspects or their accomplices, who have a motive to conceal or 
destroy evidence of criminality. 
£QNCLU£XQN 
The Utah Subpoena Powers Act meets all constitutional 
requirements for investigative subpoenas. It is accompanied by 
inherent judicial review which any witness may invoke if he feels 
that the subpoena is invalid. Any procedural requirements which 
are found to be lacking may be implied by the Court. 
Because the Act is constitutional, and any defects it 
may contain do not rise to a constitutional level, the Memorandum 
Decision Relative to Constitutionality of September 20 , 1984, 
holding the Act unconstitutional and withdrawing investigative 
authority should be reversed by this Court and the Act should be 
declared constitutional. In addition, appellant requests a 
reversal of Judge Bunnell's order quashing the subpoena to Emery 
Mining Company. ^ 
li day of WWAAAAAAA . 1985. DATED this ftyiW M  
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
&Urf.P„2 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
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NLfcU 
M THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH IN AND FOR EMERY CO. 
By. 
SEP 21 1984 
BRUCE C. FUNK, 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
RELATIVE TO 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
_ Clerk 
.Deputy 
CS NO. 1 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this 
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties 
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investiga-
tion proceeding. The Court ruled from the bench on most 
Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et s e q . ) , authorizing 
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several 
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by 
other parties on a Motion to reconsider. 
The Court previously considered the constitutional 
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and 
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the 
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in 
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the follow-
ing requirements: 
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the 
Act must be informed whether or not they are 
targets of the investigation; 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
.. -N at Page . . ^ ? — 
2. Such witnesses must be informed of 
the nature of the matter under investigation 
and the scope of the investigation; 
3. Investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to 
criminal investigations within the parameters 
of the initial good cause affidavit. 
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity 
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is 
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the 
personal rights of the citizens of this state. 
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon 
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce: 
"records which identify all officers, 
directors, consultants and employees 
(both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 
1979 to the present. Such shall include, 
but not be limited to, names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of employment 
and employee numbers, if known.11 
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general 
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any investigation 
of any criminal activity. 
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General fs 
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good 
Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal deal-
ings in this area. The State withdrew this subpoena when 
challenged in this court. 
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Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding 
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of 
the following: 
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, papers of any kind relating to 
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex, 
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski, 
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy 
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith.11 
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in 
this Court. 
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant 
to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did 
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be 
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in 
that the witness never was informed that he was a target, 
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of 
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter 
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause 
showing. He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present 
with him during these proceedings. 
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Sal 
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proce 
ing, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake 
County, also as a result of some of the information derived fr 
this investigative proceeding. This investigative proceeding 
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still open and being used for whatever purposes the State 
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act, 
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation 
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued 
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limit-
ations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena power. The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme 
Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of 
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows: 
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissable conduct so as 
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act 
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual 
citizens against violation 'of their consti tuional right of 
due process and protection against self-incrimination and 
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of 
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power 
is granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional. 
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this 
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative 
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ ^ T d a y of September, 1984. 
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